The plain speaking that cut through the hot air and diplomatic double-speak of the Munich Security Conference came from Mark Rutte. The truth underpinning the Dutch prime minister’s remarks was spelled out by Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky.
Europeans, Rutte said, should stop moaning and whining about the possibility that Donald Trump could win the US presidential election. The front-runner to replace Jens Stoltenberg as secretary general of Nato, Rutte is worth quoting in full.
“We do not spend more on defence, or ramp up ammunition production, because Trump might come back. It’s up to the Americans. I’m not an American, I cannot vote in the US. And we have to work with whoever is on the dance floor. So we have to do this because we want to do this, because it is in our interest. This is crucial. And all that whining and moaning about Trump – I hear that constantly over the last couple of days, let’s stop doing that.”
“Because we want to do this, because it is our interest.” Take note Olaf Scholz. However much Europeans wring their hands about Trump, they cannot escape the strategic choice. Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine is indeed an existential threat to the western-designed security system. But it is first and foremost a full-frontal attack on the European order. Whatever happens in Washington, Germany, France, Britain, Poland and the rest can appease the Russian leader or face him down. Ukraine, as Zelensky put it, is fighting its own, the west’s, and Europe’s war.
Win or lose in November’s election (and for the record, he is much more likely to win), Joe Biden is the last Atlanticist in the White House. The generation that saw the 20th century’s two world wars as proof that American security starts in Europe has all but passed. The shift has been generational and geographic, within the US and beyond it. America’s centres of political, economic and cultural gravity, and with them its worldview, have moved westwards from the East coast.
The days when the Congress was full of Ivy League alumni fond of soaking up the sights during visits to Paris, Rome and London have long gone. American business looks to Asia, and Washington’s diplomatic and military strategists to the threat posed by China. Populist republicans arguing that the defence of the Ukrainian border is not a vital national interest are not the first to wonder how far America’s security guarantee should extend in a world where its power is contested.
Barack Obama’s cautious response to the 2014 Russian invitation should have been a clue. Europe, and this is what Rutte was getting at, has taken half a step in acknowledging the change. Its response to Putin’s invasion, military as well as economic, has shown more resolve than the track record might have suggested. The great majority will soon reach a long-neglected target of spending two percent of national income on defence. Ursula Von der Leyen’s advocacy of an EU-wide industrial defence strategy is another step in the right direction.
But the story is not just about hardware. What’s still missing is the decisive shift in mindset that says that, with or without the Americans, Europe will organise the defence of its continent. Speeches, whether in Munich or beyond, won’t do it. So far both Europeans and Americans have been content to supply sufficient weapons to stop Putin winning. The effect, and this point was made by Zelensky, is that holding back military supplies “allows Putin to adapt to the current intensity of the war.”
The prospects on the ground for the rest of this year are probably for a costly stalemate. Putin, fresh from his military’s, albeit costly, success in retaking Avdiivka, has no interest in considering a settlement before the November election. Russian forces may make some tactical advances, but even if American military support is further delayed Moscow probably lacks the resources for a decisive breakthrough. Kyiv, short of ammunition and artillery may have to be content to hold the line.
Deadlines deferred are not choices avoided. Europeans need to decide well before the how much they are prepared to invest, politically as much as financially, in their own security. Another missing ingredient, I heard a senior Nato official say the other day, has been the willingness to give Ukraine what it needs to win rather than simply hold the line. An absence of audacity, the official called it. Audacity does not come easily to Europeans. But Putin’s victory would be Europe’s defeat.
Great to see Denmark step out and take a lead
Let Europe buy the American weapons for Ukraine