Indo-Pacific: Oceans Together, Oceans Apart
Guest Column: A Policy Leader Fellow at the European University Institute's School of Transnational Governance on how the Indo-Pacific presents an entirely new model of geopolitical relations
“I’m here, we’re here, because what happens in the Indo-Pacific will, more than any other region, shape the trajectory of the world in the 21st century.”
Antony Blinken, US Secretary of State, December 2021, Jakarta
Not so long ago the expression “Indo-Pacific” was the property of the exclusive club of foreign policy practitioners who map the geopolitical landscape. Now it is common currency, delineating the pivotal struggle in the emerging era of great power rivalry. It has redefined the competition between the United States and China in the Western Pacific as a much broader, multi-faceted contest across two of the world’s vast oceans. In the process, it has redrawn the boundaries of geopolitics.
New as it is as a strategic construct, until 1945 the Indo-Pacific was an economic and cultural reality for the nations of this vast geography for several centuries; then the post-1945 global order created a temporary and artificial schism in a relatively cohesive region.
Several trend lines have coalesced to reinvent it. It is a manifestation of a rebalancing world, with weaker rules and stronger multipolarity, that is grappling with major power competition. And it is a reflection of Washington’s effort to garner allies in its effort to remain a leading Asian power. Analysts who tend to “over-rationalise the past” like to say that the Indo-Pacific is the ‘Great Game’ of the 21st century. If so, who are the players, what are their ambitions and what are their strategies to win?
The phrase ‘Indo-Pacific’ was first used in the 1920s by Karl Haushofer, a German strategist, as part of an anti-colonial vision for remaking the international order. On the other hand, Indian historian Kalidas Nag took the term as a cultural and civilisational entity in his 1941 book India and the Pacific World. The Indo-Pacific as a modern strategic construct can be traced to a landmark speech titled Confluence of the Two Seas by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the Indian parliament in 2007.
During the following decade, Australia, Japan, Indonesia, the US and India introduced the concept in their official statements and documents. It was a response to the rapid geo-economic and geo-political shifts that has made the Indo-Pacific the centre of gravity in world politics. Every important stakeholder, within and outside the region, felt the need to engage so that they could shape the conversation before it was too late. ASEAN and EU have gripped the idea, and published their own approach to the region in 2019 and 2021 respectively.
The EU received a strong nudge from France which is a resident power with island territory and around 2 million citizens in the region. It has had an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2018. Once Germany and Netherlands came on board with their own national perspectives on the region in late 2020, it took the European Commission less than a year to release its ‘EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in September 2021 - a remarkable turnaround time by EU standards, which underscores the salience of this region for Europe’s security and prosperity.
Indo-Pacific, though, still means different things to different stakeholders. There is no consensus on its geographical boundary and normative attributes. For example, does the western limit of the Indo-Pacific end at the eastern coast of India (Australia), the western coast of India (US) or extend all the way up to the east coast of Africa (Japan, EU, India)? On the other side, does it end at the Pacific Islands (EU) or extend all the way up to the west coast of the Americas (US, India, Japan, Australia).
Stakeholders also use a combination of the terms “free”, “open”, “inclusive”, “stable”, “resilient” and “prosperous” to describe their vision for the region. But each country differs in the emphasis it places on these attributes. For the US, the focus is on security. For many others, the emphasis is economic. Despite the differences, points of convergence emerge. For example, the presence of the US, the inclusion of India, the centrality of ASEAN, an emphasis on increasing connectivity, preserving rules, and a focus on maritime security (in its widest sense) to protect the global commons.
The shadow of Thucydidean rivalry between the US and China looms large. Each stakeholder however has a different level of anxiety about China’s rise. This sets the relative weight of security and economic policy in their respective Indo-Pacific frameworks and the resources they allocate to objectives under each policy. Some scholars suggest that the clue lies in the nomenclature of the official documents which introduce their Indo-Pacific approach.
Generally, countries with a security focus use the term ‘strategy’ (the US, France). Others who are keen to focus on economic, trade and connectivity initiatives prefer descriptors such as ‘outlook’ (ASEAN), ‘vision’ (Japan) and ‘policy guidelines’ (Germany, Netherlands). India meanwhile insists that Indo-Pacific is a geographic definition and “not a strategy or a club of limited members”.
For all that, economic and security cooperation among the stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific has intensified. The pursuit of tangible outcomes runs in parallel with the search for conceptual clarity. Two important trends stand out in the emerging architecture. First, a marked increase in the institutionalisation of engagement between democracies in the region. Second, a preference for plurilateralism as the preferred mode of cooperation in response to the “shortcomings of multilateralism, untenability of unilateralism and the limits of bilateralism”.
These two trends are most visible in the breadth and depth of initiatives under the aegis of Quad - a grouping of 4 major democracies (the US, India, Japan and Australia). The group first met way back in 2004-5 to coordinate relief efforts post the Indian Ocean tsunami. It was then resurrected in 2017 to streamline efforts to maintain a rules-based order in Asia and act as a counterbalance against revisionist powers. Since then, its agenda has expanded exponentially notwithstanding the change in leadership in 3 out of 4 member countries.
Quad represents an important conceptual innovation in that its members seek alignment without the all-encompassing construct of an alliance - an attempt to forge convergence without the pressure to build congruence. Given the flexibility that this mode of engagement affords in terms of partners and agenda, Quad has now become a template for a similar 4-party grouping in West Asia which includes the UAE, Israel, India and US. This “West Asia Quad” called I2U2 will be formalised during President Biden’s visit to the region next month through a summit-level virtual meeting between the leaders.
This new epoch in international relations is also evident in a proliferation of trilateral dialogues between democratic partners, including Japan-India-US, France-India-Australia and Italy-India-Japan. On economic issues, the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative of Japan-Australia-India, the Blue Dot Network for building infrastructure comprising USA-Japan-Australia and the International Solar Alliance led by France and India are notable examples.
On security challenges, the AUKUS defence partnership of Australia-UK-USA and security dialogues that India has in ‘2+2’ format (foreign and defence ministers) with USA, Japan and Australia are cases in point. At the G7 summit in 2021 hosted by the UK, PM Boris Johnson invited India, Australia and South Korea as guests from the Indo-Pacific and proposed a ‘D10 coalition’ of democracies (G7 countries plus three) to work together on 5G technology.
So what does “Indo-Pacific” mean? Is it a geographic, cultural or a strategic concept? What is its boundary? What are its constitutive elements? There is an ancient Indian parable about six blind men and the elephant. Curious to understand what this strange animal looks like, they visit the king’s palace to examine it. Each man touches a different part of the elephant and accordingly forms his own opinion. As their debate descends into an argument, the noise wakes up the king who advises, “The elephant is a very large animal…Perhaps if you put the parts together, you will see the truth.”
It seems that every writer has the same construct. Everyone seems to have gone to the same schools and everyone tells a common tale. Really? Does anyone challenge anything anymore?
It was "common knowledge" that by 2020, China would have thrown off its communist ways and become free. Why did not someone say that "the king had no clothes"? Common knowledge is "no" knowledge.
Let's face it, peoples do not like each other any more than individuals do. Despite growing up thinking that humans are social animals, they are not! Just try to get two women that are friends to come together in their old age to support one another and you must know what the answer will be. For example, when everyone is satisfied physically, what do they do? Get a dog! You have to be commanded to "love your neighbour as yourself".
All of southeast Asia has had their experience with Chinese businessmen and they didn't like it. Just look at Cambodia. Do you really think that they want to go there again? Indians integrate a little more, but not much.
So much for your analysis of the east. And don't think that democracy is a starting point. We have enough keeping us apart for democracy to bind. And, today the world is all about hate. Where are our young people going to come from that trust might start. Not the way we are going, that is for sure.
I think that China is more intelligent than that. The Art of War says wait. Your enemy will fall right in front of you if you just wait. And the West, running around the world working on regime change will just speed that up.